Hidden Values in the Ground



FACT SHEET as of end of

May 2022

Fund Description

The **Metals Exploration Fund (class CHF)** is a sub-fund of the Metals Exploration Fund, which is a niche fund under Swiss law that invests worldwide mainly in strategic metals of mining exploration and junior mining companies.

General Fund Information

Investor Profile Public

Fund Name Metals Exploration Fund (class CHF)
Fund Type Swiss contractual investment fund,

classified as "other traditional investments

fund"

Domicile Swiss Fund

Tax TransparencyIn Germany and AustriaAsset ManagerDolefin SA, CH-Nyon

Custodian Banque Cantonale Vaudoise, CH-Lausanne

Fund Mgmt Company CACEIS (Switzerland) SA, CH-Nyon

Auditor KPMG, CH-Geneva
Inception Date December 13, 2013
Financial Year 1 January – 31 December

Subscription Weekly, cut-off Wednesday 17h00

Redemption Weekly, cut-off Wednesday 17h00+1week

ISIN CH0216430709

Additional Information

Nominal per Unit CHF 100

Management Fees 1.50% p.a.

Hurdle Rate 15% cumulative

Performance Fees 20% of the outperformance realized

above the Hurdle Rate with principle of

High Watermark

High Watermark Yes **Administrative Fees** 0.40% p.a.

Load-up Fees Maximum 2%


Redemption Fees0.50% (goes to the Fund)TER2.25% p.a. (expected)

Initial NAV CHF 100
Dividends Reinvested

Publication of NAV Swiss Fund Data AG

www.caceis.ch

Security lending none




Portfolio Structure


Stock Listings

| Australie | 12.0% | Canada | 67.4% | |
|--------------|-------|--------|-------|--|
| South Africa | 6.8% | UK | 13.8% | |

Metals Allocation



10 Top Holding





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Performance & Risks

 NAV as of 30.05.2022
 CHF 155.00

 Fund since inception
 55.00% (*)

 Fund (ytd)
 -12.07%

 Units in circulation (rounded)
 428'667

Fund size (rounded) CHF 74'463'631
Launch date December 13, 2013

Monthly Returns

| in % | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Year |
|------|--------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|
| 2008 | | | | | 4.69 | -6.48 | -15.23 | -14.01 | -30.26 | -52.25 | -7.41 | 2.24 | -77.51 |
| 2009 | 18.62 | 1.30 | -1.01 | 8.74 | 22.74 | -7.61 | 4.73 | 1.86 | 18.82 | -2.70 | 17.14 | 4.32 | 121.04 |
| 2010 | -6.22 | 4.37 | 12.24 | 10.28 | -6.86 | -9.60 | -0.59 | 7.27 | 21.74 | 12.75 | 14.34 | 7.68 | 83.83 |
| 2011 | -10.12 | 9.41 | -2.34 | 0.40 | -9.17 | -7.73 | 0.85 | -1.12 | -19.66 | 13.27 | -1.96 | -7.59 | -33.56 |
| 2012 | 14.97 | 0.70 | -11.75 | -7.01 | -16.77 | 0.09 | 2.53 | 4.61 | 9.85 | -3.09 | -9.78 | -2.06 | -20.16 |
| 2013 | -2.04 | -8.29 | 1.52 | -20.57 | -6.38 | -19.64 | 8.19 | 5.68 | -14.28 | -1.74 | -11.65 | -5.22 | -56.05 |
| 2014 | 10.95 | 6.64 | -7.57 | -2.57 | -4.87 | 17.45 | -0.49 | -1.59 | -18.69 | -14.25 | 1.24 | -6.04 | -22.68 |
| 2015 | -7.52 | 6.45 | -4.26 | -5.13 | -1.23 | -8.46 | -17.30 | -3.67 | -6.09 | 9.52 | -7.60 | -5.17 | -41.96 |
| 2016 | -8.50 | 26.33 | 15.64 | 35.38 | -1.25 | 16.77 | 16.43 | -3.96 | 4.50 | -7.3 | -4.67 | -2.94 | 109.14 |
| 2017 | 18.83 | -8.25 | -2.73 | -7.26 | -9.89 | -0.91 | 6.01 | 8.87 | -4.31 | 0.92 | -4.40 | 8.27 | 1.30 |
| 2018 | -5.79 | -8.04 | -0.27 | 4.01 | -2.27 | -5.62 | -2.72 | -5.94 | -0.52 | 1.02 | -3.89 | 0.25 | -26.57 |
| 2019 | 11.69 | 13.30 | -5.04 | -7.53 | -0.35 | 12.78 | 8.28 | 6.69 | 1.87 | -0.14 | -3.78 | 17.66 | 66.13 |
| 2020 | -1.27 | -2.90 | -30.13 | 28.99 | 18.73 | 10.48 | 20.12 | 8.54 | -1.10 | -5.53 | 13.17 | 21.85 | 90.39 |
| 2021 | -4.68 | 11.86 | -5.89 | 4.88 | 4.00 | -6.89 | -7.10 | -7.89 | -12.84 | 19.66 | -16.33 | 2.64 | -21.89 |
| 2022 | -3.72 | 6.30 | 7.52 | -10.46 | -10.77 | | | | | | | | -12.07 |

^(*) The fund includes performance figures that reproduce those of the Cayman structure launched on May 1, 2008, incorporating the CHF sub-fund since inception with an investment policy similar to its previous structure and managed by the same asset manager.

Sub-Sector Returns 2022 (*)

| % | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Ytd |
|---------|-------|------|-----|-------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| Gold | -7.3 | 6.2 | 4.5 | -16.8 | -5.2 | | | | | | | | -18.8 |
| Silver | -28.9 | 19.1 | 3.9 | -17.3 | -33.7 | | | | | | | | -51.8 |
| PGM | 4.8 | 7.7 | 0.5 | -7.69 | -4.6 | | | | | | | | -0.1 |
| CRM | -0.4 | -4.1 | 8.3 | -15.0 | -7.1 | | | | | | | | -18.3 |
| вм | -5.9 | 0.1 | 7.4 | -13.7 | -11.4 | | | | | | | | -22.7 |
| Average | -7.5 | 5.8 | 4.9 | -14.1 | -12.4 | | | | | | | | -22.8 |

^(*) For indication only: Performance based on fund's holdings, equally weighted, not FX-adjusted. The aim of these statistics is to show the performance attribution of the metals sub-sectors during the reporting month.

Forex Exposure (net rounded)

| in % | AUD | CAD | GBP | ZAR | CHF |
|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|
| | 49.9 | 37.8 | 5.3 | 6.8 | 0.2 |



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Investment Strategy

Outlook


The Inflation "blame-game"

In President Biden's appearance on Friday, 3rd of June, he made a couple of statements that merit to be discussed (link here):

"I've been very clear – fighting inflation is my top economic priority – my inflation plan is to give the Federal Reserve the space they need to operate" (minute 37)

Price stability is the foremost task of a central bank, and not that of a government! Implicitly President Biden confirms by his statement that the Fed has not been independent thus far; did the Fed had to play by the rules of its administration?

Biden then goes on and puts the inflation blame on President Putin although we all know that consumer prices strongly advanced well ahead of Russian invasion in Ukraine. (As a sidenote here Russian President's reaction on Biden's allegation: *Putin says US decision to print money led to increase in global food prices*- link here)



Then we saw an interview with Former Fed Governor Kevin Warsh who stated:

"All if this problem, principally around this inflation squeeze, they were fixable at considerably less costs, 6, 9, 12 months ago. All rule of thumb, to get the inflation rate to fall, you better bring the policy rate to the inflation rate. Inflation 12 month ago was 3.5%. We could have conceivable raising rate than to 3.5%.

Now inflation is at 8.5%, probably going higher, could you imagine how markets would react if the Fed fund rates get even half to that level? So, that shows we have a problem (link here).

We could go on with other similar statements, but our point herein is basically to stress that the *inflation genie is finally out of the bottle*, and nobody wants to take the responsibility. We emphasized throughout the past years that relentless money printing will sooner or later translate into inflation. Investors and the financial industry applauded for all the monetary and fiscal stimulus' as their <u>paper</u> wealth effect in asset prices seemed as granted and guaranteed. How that all does end?




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The 1970's inflationary period that resembles in some form to our current state of affair may serve as a template: Although <u>real</u> GDP boomed from 1970-80, US equity returns were basically flat in <u>nominal</u> and <u>down</u> by some 80% in <u>inflation-adjusted terms</u>. As prices go up, so do interest rates and the present value of future cash-flow of equities shrinks; as sentiment turns negative, price-earnings ratios start to drop, etc., etc.

Generally, commodities and related companies withstood the downward pressure of stock valuation:



We have doubts whether this time will be only as negative as the 1970s. Back then, the US was a creditor country (positive Net International Investment Position – NIIP) and higher borrowing costs were income for the US. Today, the NIIP stands at minus USD 18.1 trillion (a record 80% of GDP) – therefore, interest costs on these cumulated current account deficits must be paid to foreigners (i.e., a reason to eventually devalue the USD?).

Also, Kevin Walsh doubts that should Fed fund rates get lifted to only 50% of the current running inflation (8.7%), meaning to 4.35%, that would already break the neck of financial and the housing market!

The inflation blame-game is a symptom of despair. It looks to us that central banks and governments are finally catching up with reality and they became very, very nervous. In our view, two options are left:

Are they erring towards combating inflation and risking that asset prices will collapse on much higher interest rates what would bring the financial system into its knees like between 1929-32 (Great Depression), or rather "lifting" nominal values of assets versus debt, while losing the control on inflation?

Inflation like deflation is nothing more than a wealth-transfers: from the creditor to the debtor and vice-versa. We continue to watch and see but we will not get blinded by tough talk unaccompanied by action.

In any case, the tipping point for either outcome will finally be given by market participants, as always. As more and more investors will realize that both scenarios are dire, they will adjust portfolios accordingly.

The endgame got even closer and in either scenario precious metals and their mining stocks should shine.

"In a secular bull trend, the only risk investors are facing is to exit too early!"